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THE STATE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS IN GOVERNANCE:
VIVE LA DIFFRENCE!
HANS A. LINDE*
I. ARE STATE COURTS MINOR FORMS OF UNITED STATES COURTS?
What is common to state and federal courts is easy to see-so
easy that many lawyers, judges, and academics assume that federal
formulas for review of official actions equally apply to state law.'
The point of federalism, however, lies in the scope it leaves for
differences. Our common commitment is to the rule of law, not to
one common rule of law. The states' civil, criminal, and public laws
diverge even though officials and citizens affirm common values
like "freedom," "equality," "fairness," and "democracy."2
The commonalities are important, but so are the differences,
which are more interesting. We should not assume one common
analysis in the face of legal differences that are truly constitutional
-that is to say, "constitutive" of government-and for which
state courts take on responsibilities that federal courts decline.
State courts also copy terms like "standing," "ripeness," and
* Professor Linde served on the Oregon Supreme Court from 1977 to 1990. He now
teaches state constitutional law at Willamette University College of Law. This paper was
prepared for a conference at the College of William & Mary School of Law titled "Dual
Enforcement of Constitutional Norms."
1. The present commentary will not rehash past critiques of this practice with respect
to comparable state and federal constitutional provisions for due process, equality, freedom
of expression and religion, and law enforcement. See Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are
Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993);
Hans A. Linde, Without 'Due Process" Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125
(1970).
2. Cf. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation andAuthority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1147, 1159-60 (1993) (I am concerned only with those aspects of a state
constitutional text that are of 'constitutional dimension.' Generally, this means the
constitutional protections of liberty, equality, and due process, as well as the structuring of
political institutions that aim simultaneously to realize these values and to represent
constituent interests.").
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"justiciability" that are used in federal courts and taught in law
schools, though they are not the words of statutes or constitutions.
Here, however, the practice in the state and the federal courts is
even less identical.
Consider only a few recent examples. The Nevada Supreme Court
ordered the Nevada legislature to fund constitutionally mandated
schools, without the required two-thirds majority vote for new
taxes, if necessary.3 In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court
required the state legislature to choose either to appropriate
election campaign funds required by law or to repeal the law.4 The
Illinois Supreme Court reportedly ordered the state comptroller
.general to resume paying judges cost-of-living increases without
awaiting actual litigation.5 The Oregon Supreme Court has "as-
sumed" that it may, by writ of mandamus, order the legislature to
fund the courts-the required adequate level presumably to be set
by the court.6 It is hard to think of a federal court issuing similar
orders to Congress or its members.
About a dozen states-by constitution or statute-authorize
governors or legislators to obtain advisory opinions of state court
justices.7 The Indiana Supreme Court is assigned a role in review-
ing whether the governor has suffered an inability to discharge
official duties.' More often, state courts entertain and decide
3. Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada, 71 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Nev. 2003).
4. Bates v. Dir. of Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 763 N.E.2d 6, 15 (Mass. 2002).
5. Abdon M. Pallasch, Justices Say They'll Decide Pay Raise Issues, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 30, 2003, at 18. The order was later withdrawn on motion of the Illinois Attorney
General to permit named parties to litigate the issue. Other courts have asserted "inherent
power" to compel appropriations of funds that the judges deem necessary for their functions.
For supporting sources, see ROBERTT. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 732-37 (3d ed.
1999).
6. State ex rel. Metro. Pub. Defender Serv. Inc. v. Courtney, 64 P.3d 1138, 1139 (Or.
2003) ("[W]e assume that this court's power includes the authority to order the legislature
to provide certain minimum levels of funding to sustain the core functions of the judicial
branch.").
7. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the 'Passive Virtues" Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845-46 (2001) ("State constitutions in Colorado, Florida,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota
authorize the judiciary to give advice when the legislature or governor so requests. In
Alabama, Delaware, and Oklahoma, the advisory function is statutorily assigned...."). These
advisory opinions are not adjudications.
8. IND. CONST. art. 5, § 10(d); see In re Temp. Inability of Governor Frank L. O'Bannon
to Discharge the Duties of Office, 798 N.E.2d 838, 838 (Ind. 2003) (confirming temporary
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disputes between state or local officials when federal courts would
dismiss comparable cases for lack of "standing" or "ripeness" or
some other shibboleth. Although the Supreme Court rejects
taxpayer standing, state courts routinely allow individual taxpayers
to challenge official acts with trivial fiscal impacts.9 A claim that
state officials spend unappropriated funds or do not publish proper
accounts may find a way into a state, but not a federal, court.1"
Also, many state cases decide disputes between governors and
legislators directly, often involving their respective powers, without
needing a discharged official like Federal Trade Commissioner
Humphrey to sue for his salary,1 or an immigrant like Chadha to
resist deportation.12 The legality of executive vetoes is often
litigated between legislators and governors, 3 as is delegation to
agencies that includes legislators. 4
Let me briefly examine three questions. What explains why state
and local officials often seek court decisions on issues of governance
against which federal case law has erected many doctrinal hurdles?
Do the same doctrines also apply to the position of state courts?
inability and transferring powers to the lieutenant governor).
9. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952) (dismissing
taxpayers' appeal despite their standing in New Jersey court); Lipscomb v. State Bd. of
Higher Educ., 753 P.2d 939 (Or. 1988) (interpreting a constitutional amendment changing
the governor's veto power).
10. Compare OR. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4, 5 (establishing the constitutional necessity of an
appropriation for a withdrawal from the treasury), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, and United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974) (denying standing to secure public accounting
of "public money").
11. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (disapproving of the
President's dismissal of a commissioner with a statutory term).
12. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983) (invalidating congressional disapproval of
acts delegated to an agency). Denial of suits on behalf of congressional prerogatives is not
ironclad. See, e.g., United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). In Chadha, the Senate
appeared in order to defend a legislative veto provision when the alien and the Department
of Justice were on the same side. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 928; cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979) (dismissing a Senator's challenge to the President's termination of a treaty with
no majority opinion); McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 269 (D. Idaho 1981), affd, 454
U.S. 1025 (1981) (dismissing a Senator's congressionally authorized constitutional challenge
to a judicial appointment).
13. See, e.g., Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514,515 (Wyo. 2000) (deciding a governor's suit
against collective legislators concerning power to veto proposed constitutional amendments).
14. Almond v. R.I. Lottery Comm'n, 756 A.2d 186, 191 (R.I. 2000) (sustaining delegation
of power to the lottery commission composed mainly of legislators, in a suit by the governor
against the commission).
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And is a difference between state and federal views of litigable
issues likely to cause conflicts?
II. DISTINCTIVE ROLES OF STATE COURTS
The simplest reason why state courts are often called upon to
resolve conflicts among public officials is that no one else has final
authority to do it. Can we imagine a lawsuit by a president against
an attorney general, like Governor Kirk Fordice's petition to the
Mississippi Supreme Court to order the state's attorney general,
Mike Moore, not to litigate certain claims involving Medicaid
funds?' 5 Of course we cannot; presidents can simply replace the
attorney general or other officials, although at some political cost,
as President Nixon learned. Disagreements within the unified
executive branch are resolved hierarchically within a department,
or by largely unknown assistants in the Executive Office acting for
the president. Few governors have similar executive power.
A. Settling the Law in Decentralized Governments
Although, after 1789, all states purported to follow the federal
model of separating the branches of government, most, in fact, have
splintered the executive branch among several independently
elected officials, often with constitutionally assigned duties, and
often from opposing political parties.16 Most state prosecutors are
locally elected, notwithstanding the governors' stated obligations
to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Moreover, many state
programs are conducted by elected officials of cities, counties, and
districts, who may get conflicting legal advice from their own or
15. In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429, 433 (Miss. 1997) (denying a petition to the supreme
court for a writ of mandamus on the grounds that relief should be sought in circuit court).
Similarly, Georgia's governor sued in state court to compel the state's attorney general to
dismiss an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging violation of the separation of powers.
Perdue v. Baker, 586 S.E.2d 606, 607 (Ga. 2003) (denying relief on the merits despite
apparent mootness).
16. See, e.g., John Devlin, Toward a State ConstitutionalAnalysis ofAllocation ofPowers:
Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMPLE L.
REv. 1205, 1240 (1993) (noting that some state constitutions were written to strengthen the
legislature and weaken the executive branch).
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from differing sources.' 7 These officials sometimes litigate the
disputed issue among themselves. In short, how judges approach
intra-governmental disputes in the unitary national executive
cannot be lifted intact to the states.
18
State legislatures lack the well-developed capacity of Congress to
conduct their own investigations by means of committees with
investigatory staffs and subpoena power. If a state legislature
assigns these powers to a specialized investigative officer with
authority to seek judicial enforcement, few state courts would
dismiss such a suit for lack of personal standing, as the federal
district court did in the comptroller general's suit to obtain
information from Vice President Cheney.'" In the setting of state
government, doubts whether a chief executive, simply by virtue of
that office, is immune from suit or subpoena seem anomalous.
Another difference demands easier access to judicial review in
state courts. States and their subdivisions cannot function unless
they are assured of the money to pay their debts. Tax measures
may be vulnerable to public elections, contests, and lawsuits. For
example, San Francisco sued its own controller,2 ° and ten local
assessors in Washington sued the state comptroller to secure a
judicial decision.2 ' Sometimes legislatures will add special provi-
sions for an expedited adjudication in the state's highest court.22 If
the Nevada legislature had relied only on the advice of legislative
17. One dramatic example is the conflicting advice given to Florida county officials in the
2000 election by the elected secretary of state and the elected attorney general, neither of
whom was subject to the direction of the governor. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, BUSH V.
GORE, THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 9-18 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds.,
2001). A later example is the insistence of local officials in San Francisco and elsewhere on
marrying same-sex couples on grounds that state laws to the contrary are unconstitutional.
See Lockyer v. City & County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 473 (Cal. 2004).
Lacking another central deciding authority, litigation between state agencies and cities,
school districts, and other local authorities is commonplace. See, e.g., Ind. Dep't of Natural
Res. v. Newton County, 802 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. 2004); City of Crown Point v. Lake County, 510
N.E.2d 684 (Ind. 1987).
18. Why federal doctrines often do not fit state governance is further described in Hans
A. Linde, Structures and Terms of Consent: Delegation, Discretion, Separation of Powers,
Representation, Participation, Accountability?, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 823 (1999).
19. Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 52 (D.D.C. 2002).
20. City & County of S.F. v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1982).
21. Belas v. Kiga, 959 P.2d 1037 (Wash. 1998).
22. See Hart v. Paulus, 676 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Or. 1984).
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counsel or the attorney general to raise school taxes by a majority
instead of a two-thirds vote, neither teachers nor outside suppliers
would have placed much faith in that action.23 Nor might some
industries that states want to attract with large but constitutionally
questionable subsidies. 24 The authority of state and local officials to
incur debts is hedged in by many statutory and constitutional
constraints. Banks and bond houses are unlikely to lend money if
there is any doubt whether these constraints have been observed.
Declarations by the state's attorney general or local counsel on
behalf of the borrower may not suffice. Some statutes allow local
entities to pursue the needed adjudication by suing essentially all
eligible objectors at large, without having to find a friendly taxpayer
to bring such a suit.25
B. Historic Tasks of State Judges
Much of this litigation contradicts the dogma that judges should
keep out of disputes about governance until a party asserts an
injury to its own interest. Are these divergences by state courts and
legislators at worst unwise, or do they contradict basic principles
about judicial power that are common to the state and federal
constitutions? Recent studies by Professor Helen Hershkoff and
others contradict the assumption that state courts are cut on the
same pattern as the courts authorized by Article III of the United
States Constitution.26 Historically, of course, state courts existed
before 1789, although the original states later adopted new
constitutions. Early state, not federal, judiciaries in turn served as
models for later states.
23. See supra text accompanying note 3.
24. See, e.g., In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Ray Romer on House Bill 91S-
1005, 814 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1991) (issuing an advisory opinion requested by the governor after
obtaining the attorney general's opinion on a scheme to attract a large United Airlines
facility to Denver, which was approved by a divided vote of the justices).
25. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 33.710, 33.720 (2001) (providing that a municipal
corporation's governing body may proceed in rem against the municipal corporation and its
electors, taxpayers, and other unnamed interested persons, after giving notice by
publication).
26. See Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 1836 '("State courts, however, are not bound by Article
III, and judicial practice differs in some states-and differs radically-from the federal
model.").
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Institutionally, the position of state judges and legislators
contrasts with those of their federal counterparts. Early judges
often were the only full-time state officials besides the governor and
a few other elected officials, and the only professionals; part-time
legislators assembled only for relatively short sessions. The states
did not need statutes for most law or judicial remedies; with
exceptions such as inheritance and, after independence, criminal
laws, legislatures could rely on judges to apply common law or
equity to resolve most disputes and could concentrate on addressing
particular economic needs of their various communities. Unlike
federal judges, state courts long have administered estates outside
any adversary litigation. They make rules of conduct for lawyers
(including disposition of their trust accounts), for other judges, and
for candidates who aspire to become judges. Sometimes, at the
request of the bar, they claim a monopoly against legislators over
making rules for lawyers and even for non-lawyers.27 County judges
combine judicial functions with chairing county commissions.2"
Nonetheless, state courts often recite the federal requisites for
adjudicating disputes, and the defending counsel will invoke these
requisites unless their client actually wants a decision.
C. Compatibility with Federal Law
It surely raises no federal concern if a state court decides a legal
dispute that a federal court would not entertain, when the decision
rests on state law. What if the dispute involves an issue of federal
law? Many state and local programs depend on satisfying conditions
attached to federal financial support just as much as on satisfying
state law. They must comply with environmental and other laws;
they must avoid unlawful interference with interstate commerce;
they must thread their way between the free exercise of religion
and its official establishment. When state procedures allow a court
27. See WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 702-32 (including several supporting cases).
28. Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 1871 (citing Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County
Court, Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGALHIST. 282,
282 (1976) and Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 169, 207-08 (1983), on the nonadjudicatory functions of state courts).
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to resolve such disputes about the state's law, there is no apparent
reason why the court should not also dispose of the federal issues.
Law school courses largely confine constitutional law to judicial
decisions by the United States Supreme Court, but sometimes a
state court must decide a question of federal law for its state that
cannot be further appealed to the Supreme Court. When the New
Jersey Supreme Court decided, in a taxpayer's action, that a law
requiring Bible reading in public schools did not violate the First
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court allowed that a state
court might render such an opinion, though the taxpayer's interest
was insufficient in a federal court.29 In principle, even before
Baker v. Carr,"° a state court could decide that the Fourteenth
Amendment bound the states in drawing election districts with or
without review by the Supreme Court, though in practice, when
that court will not enforce a law, others often will not treat it as law
at all."l Similarly, the Supremacy Clause binds state judges to
uphold a state's unquestioned duty to maintain republican forms
of government, when that issue is properly before them. The
Kansas Supreme Court in 1973, in a suit by the state treasurer
against the secretary of state, decided that letting a governor
reorganize executive departments subject to legislative disapproval
did not violate the Republican Form Clause. 2 State judges have
reviewed similar disputes about governance in advisory opinions.3 3
In another case, the Colorado Supreme Court found a term limits
initiative to be non-republican, though the court based its decision
on a second ground.34
29. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952) (dismissing
taxpayers' appeal despite their standing in state court).
30. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Oregon Supreme Court was authorized to review legislative
districts in 1952. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1953).
31. See Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and
Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 466 (1976); Lawrence Gene
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1212 (1978).
32. VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 242 (Kan. 1973).
33. See In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate Concerning House Bill 1078,536 P.2d
308, 316-17 (Colo. 1975) (finding that judicial participation in a redistricting decision is not
inconsistent with republican government); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d
1, 15-16 (R.I. 1992) (allowing legislators to manage the state lottery commission).
34. See Morrissey v. State, 951 P.2d 911, 916 (Colo. 1998) (holding that coercing
legislators' support for a term limits amendment is inconsistent with republican
1280 [Vol. 46:1273
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No law keeps state courts from safeguarding republican govern-
ment in their states if the issue properly comes before them. Most
would do so, as the Delaware court did in 1847, if the requirement
were expressed in the state constitutions."5 Others may be reluctant
to decide a federal issue that the Supreme Court will not review,
especially when the claim is coupled with more familiar arguments
that will have the same result. In Evans v. Romer,3" the Colorado
court passed over a plausible argument of non-republican process
to decide the case on more familiar equal protection grounds,
although ordinarily issues of unlawful procedure come before sub-
stantive claims.37 Yet the Colorado justices apparently would have
responded to a request for an advisory opinion on the issue of
republican governance, and indeed cited that clause as one basis for
invalidating a term limits initiative.38
What is anomalous about state courts applying federal law, as
the Supremacy Clause requires, regardless of whether a federal
court would decide the dispute? Nothing. As the Chief Justice
and Justice Scalia wrote in Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish,39 it is "a rather
unremarkable proposition" that state courts apply federal law to
issues of state governance in advisory opinions or other proceed-
ings that are not reviewable in any federal court.4 ° On the contrary,
easier access to the state's own courts secures wider compliance
government).
35. Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 499 (1847) (holding the Act of 1847, which
authorized Delaware voters to determine whether alcohol would be sold in the state, an
unconstitutional departure from a republican form of government); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3;
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Beyond dispute, "[t]he guaranty necessarily implies a duty on the
part of the States themselves to provide [republican] government." Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874).
36. 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993), affd, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
37. Id. at 1273 (invalidating a constitutional amendment as denying equal protection for
the homosexual minority). The same argument might have been made in Mulkey v. Reitman,
413 P.2d 825, 836 (Cal. 1966) (invalidating an amendment barring open housing laws), affd,
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See generally Hans A. Linde, When Initiative
Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government" The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR.
L. REV. 19 (1993) (discussing the relationship between the constitutional guarantee of a
republican form of government and plebiscite initiatives).
38. See Morrissey, 951 P.2d at 916.
39. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
40. Id. at 636 (Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reviewing a state court judgment at the request of defendants, though federal courts would
deny the plaintiffs standing).
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with constitutional norms in time to prevent actual harm. If a state
court were to misapply the Republican Form Clause to the prejudice
of someone's legal interest, the Supreme Court could, of course,
reexamine its ill-considered and overly broad self-denial in Chief
Justice White's old Pacific Telephone Co. opinion.4'
III. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND LEGISLATIVE POWER
A. The Straw Man of Justiciability
Let me dispel any impression that I would discard all prerequi-
sites for deciding legal disputes at the request of litigants. To the
contrary: On the Oregon Supreme Court, we often denied taxpayer
standing, dismissed moot cases regardless of their importance, and
avoided constitutional holdings whenever a lower level analysis
sufficed.42 We might well have decided many of the cited recent
examples differently. But we took care to base these decisions on
the laws governing remedies, not on large general principles.
Sometimes, however, legislatures direct the state supreme court
to decide the validity of a statute in a special suit brought for that
purpose.
In the one decision that was based on constitutional grounds, we
dismissed such a suit as a request for an advisory opinion rather
than an adjudication, because the named parties on both sides
favored sustaining the statute.43 It is quite another thing to say that
a statute could not direct courts to decide a legal dispute between
41. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (denying Supreme Court
jurisdiction to review Oregon Supreme Court's decision sustaining an initiated tax).
42. See, e.g., Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987) (rejecting
exceptions to mootness); Gruber v. Lincoln Hosp. Dist., 588 P.2d 1281 (Or. 1979) (denying
taxpayer standing). Along with limiting constructions of statutes or ordinances, there rarely
is any reason to decide on the constitutionality of common law or equitable holdings that rest
within the courts' own authority, until lawmakers enact a policy that makes constitutional
review unavoidable. Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294 (Or. 1989) (limiting an
injunction against political expression on shopping center property). See generally Wallace
P. Carson, Jr., "Last Things Last" A Methodological Approach to Legal Argument in State
Courts, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 641 (1983) (suggesting ways for practitioners to frame
constitutional issues in state courts).
43. Oregon Med. Ass'n v. Rawls, 574 P.2d 1103 (Or. 1978) (dismissing a statutory suit as
nonadversarial). But cf. Hart v. Paulus, 676 P.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Or. 1984) (allowing a similar
statutory suit when the opposing positions were "vigorously argued").
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genuine adversaries unless the decision would have a present,
practical effect on a concrete, personal interest at stake in the
dispute-the criteria that are labeled "standing,". "ripeness," and
"mootness." A case that fails those tests then is said to lack a
quality called "justiciability." Of course, the term states a conclu-
sion, not an explanation. Once on that conceptual escalator,
justiciability soon is called "jurisdictional," with the consequence
that judges must raise it on their own motion. This leaves judg-
ments open to future attacks even when standing or mootness went
undisputed-those awkward bonds may not have to be paid off after
all!-and finally that fatal effect needlessly is attributed to the state
constitution.
B. Misreading Constitutional Texts
Yet why? The literal words of the constitutional texts do not
compel it. To "vest" the judicial power in the courts says only that
courts derive authority to adjudicate from the constitution rather
than only from legislation, and that legislation cannot "divest" them
of it. This says nothing at all about legislation to entrust judges
with functions besides contested adjudications. Nor do laws that
direct courts to decide specified types of legal disputes invade the
powers of another branch." "Cases" or "controversies," the words
that are cited as restricting the jurisdiction of federal courts,4" do
not appear in most state judicial articles. Some states have
authorized advisory opinions by statute.46 Extensive scholarship
shows that, historically, American state courts and their common
law and chancery predecessors were not so narrowly confined.47
44. Separation of powers clauses characteristically state that persons charged with duties
under the legislative, executive, or judicial branch may not exercise a power or function
assigned to another branch. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("Persons charged with the
exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others ...."); N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("No
person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers
properly belonging to either of the others ...."); OR. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("[N]o person charged
with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of
another....").
45. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
46. Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 1845-46 (listing Alabama, Delaware, and Oklahoma as
authorizing advisory opinions by statute).
47. See generally Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
2005] 1283
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C. Broaden Public Interest Standing Rather than Disregard
Mootness?
To import federal doctrines while maintaining actual state
practice creates needless dilemmas for state courts. For instance,
federal courts may consider taxpayer challenges to expenditures
unmanageable, no matter how much money is at issue. When a
state court allows such a suit, it uses the pretense of a selfish stake
in a few dollars to allow a useful public action to test the legality of
governmental acts. But constitutions do not demand that a plain-
tiff's stake in the disputed governmental act must concern money,
property, or another self-interest. Consider the writs of habeas
corpus, which may challenge the detention of another person who
may be unable to petition for it, or of quo warranto to test the
exercise of a public office that the petitioner does not claim or want.
State and local officials bring legal issues to state courts for reasons
unrelated to any practical effect on their own private interests.
When laws authorize these officials to sue on behalf of others, why
may not legislators equally authorize non-official groups to do the
same? Many private persons devote time, money, and dedication to
causes that matter as much to them as some material self-interest.
Objections to official religious displays and protection of the
environment and non-human species are only two examples of
contemporary concerns that do not lend themselves to such a self-
centered test.
What is gained by first requiring a public interest group to locate
a student or parent who can allege an adverse personal effect, and
thereafter to allow the litigation to continue after the loss of that
personal self-interest moots the named plaintiffs request for
relief? Allowing properly defined interest groups to protect their
common interest in court is a more logical solution to recurring
problems of mootness than continuing a lawsuit on grounds of
public importance after the named plaintiffs no longer have a
Requirement?, 78YALE L.J. 816(1969) (arguing that the belief that the Constitution requires
injury to a personal interest is historically unfounded); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961) (examining the common law
"public action" and the development of rules of standing).
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personal stake to be remedied by a judgment, or searching for
substitute new plaintiffs who can claim such a stake.
A different question arises when a case becomes moot while on
appeal. Once, after Oregon's Supreme Court agreed to review a
decision invalidating a county ordinance, the county moved to
dismiss the review it had sought, provided that the dismissal would
not vacate the opinion of the court of appeals.48 When we asked
the parties to explain this unusual request, we learned that the
successful challenger had undertaken to pay the county's litigation
expenses if the appellate court opinion was left intact. In other
words, the winner paid the county to preserve a favorable judicial
precedent.49 Nonetheless, the motion to dismiss review on those
terms was allowed by a 4-3 vote, leaving the questionable opinion
on the books. Such decisions, however, need not be made on purely
formal grounds concerning the finality of lower court decisions and
appellate court jurisdiction, let alone on constitutional grounds.
Surely a court can distinguish between the disposition of moot
appeals from an unreported trial court judgment that concerns only
the parties and a disputed appellate opinion that restricts the
constitutional powers of governments throughout the state.50
In fact, state courts have mainly been pragmatic in allowing or
dismissing equitable, extraordinary, or declaratory remedies to
review governmental acts, as Louis Jaffe found forty years ago.51
48. Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. Multnomah County, 734 P.2d 885, 887 (Or. 1987).
As the county requested, the court chose a nonvacating precedent, Saechao v. Matsakoun,
727 P.2d 126 (Or. 1986), over a contrary one, Banister Continental Corp. v. N. W. Pipeline
Corp., 724 P.2d 288 (Or. 1986).
49. In answering the supreme court's inquiry, the respondent candidly explained:
In addition to that Opinion being important to respondent in its dealings with
the petitioner, it is important for respondent in its dealings with other
governmental entities in this state. Respondent is hopeful it will not be put to
the great expense not only of money, but time, of its key employees in
relitigating similar issues involving other governmental entities.
Part of the benefit that respondent should receive from its settlement of
disputes with Multnomah County is the ability to maintain the Court of
Appeals Opinion intact.
Ackerley, 734 P.2d at 887.
50. For a critique of rigid mootness doctrines in federal jurisprudence, see Evan Tsen
Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603
(1992).
51. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 103-09 (1965); Louis
L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REV. 255, 256-58,
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Pragmatic reasons also color the courts' use or non-use of the
doctrines they profess to share with the federal courts. "Separation
of powers" is invoked selectively to protect judicial prerogatives
and to allow judges to avoid taking on unwanted tasks. When an
occasional state court calls a question "political," it likely means a
policy choice unconstrained by law, in Louis Henkin's sense, rather
than a bar to intervention in the state's political institutions.52
In other respects, state courts are closer to politics than their
federal colleagues, whether the state judges are elected or ap-
pointed. I reject the thoughtless notion that a judge on an elective
court should approach a legal issue differently from an appointed
colleague in a neighboring state. Elective state courts are, however,
more likely to have some members with prior legislative experience
than the Supreme Court, at least since Harry Truman appointed
his congressional friends Fred Vinson, Harold Burton, and Shay
Minton to the Court.53 In the smaller state capitals, if not in
California or New York, judges and legislators are more likely
to meet informally as well as in official collaborations on law
reforms. 4 More important, state courts depend on highly contested
304-05 (1961); see also Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 1852-59 (citing useful sources). The old
writs of mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto are means of challenging the legality of
officials' actions that once needed the participation or consent of a state's attorney, but in
practice private "relators" can now plead such claims to judicial review in the name of the
state. Similarly, any person can seek a writ of habeas corpus ex parte the person alleged to
be unlawfully detained.
52. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). In
view of such decisions as Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (reviewing a refusal to
seat an elected U.S. Representative), United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983)
(invalidating congressional veto of agency rules), Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998) (finding the Line Item Veto Act violates the Presentment Clause), and Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (preempting the congressional process for settling a contested presidential
election), Supreme Court abstention now appears mainly in the refusal to analyze
institutional constraints on executive acts in foreign relations or asserted "national security,"
as distinct from domestic guarantees of individual rights. Compare Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (refusing to decide whether a treaty termination needs Senate consent), with
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding congressional assent to settlement
of private claims against Iran), and New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(denying an injunction against publishing "classified" Pentagon papers).
53. In addition to legislators winning elections to judgeships, it is common for elected
judges to move on to other elective offices; for example, North Carolina's U.S. Senator and
former justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court Sam Ervin, or Oregon's Governor and
former justice of the Oregon Supreme Court Ted Kulongoski.
54. See Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
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state, and sometimes county, budgets for funding their facilities,
operations, and personnel-a fact that does not encourage them to
expand legal remedies.55 On the other hand, state courts some-
times misapply their final say on the allocation of institutional
powers as a weapon to defend their own turf and to fend off
unwanted assignments from lawmakers.
Yet such pragmatism is ill-served by formal doctrines of
justiciability. Courts do not take doctrines that concern themselves
lightly, especially those declared to be "jurisdictional." Rigid tests
of "standing," "ripeness," or "mootness" do not lend themselves to ad
hoc evaluation. Defendants will invoke them whenever possible to
gain a quick dismissal, and judges will feel bound to apply them in
all cases. Without recognition of real differences among legal
claims, insistence on an immediate personal stake places some
threats to individual rights (for instance, some discretionary law
enforcement practices) beyond preventive remedies and effectively
leaves important issues of lawful governance beyond judicial
scrutiny.5 6 In turn, claims deserving decision need not survive
individual mootness if qualified organizations can litigate public
actions in their own names.
CONCLUSION
In sum, rejecting premature or advisory litigation is good policy,
but rigid tests of "justiciability" breed evasions and legal fictions.
It is prudent to keep judicial intervention within statutory or
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117, 119 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988). Oregon's Chief
Justice is by statute a member of the Oregon Law Commission, and judges often participate
in work groups on commission projects. OR. REV. STAT. § 173.315 (2001).
55. Concerns for budgetary consequences may have a more significant impact than
judicial elections or the personal social views of state judges when choosing to seek costly
reforms of state programs in federal rather than in state courts. Cf. Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (examining constitutional litigators' preference
for trial in federal courts). These concerns did not, however, deter state courts from
supervising decades-long reforms of public school funding in pursuit of educational equality.
For a discussion of apprehensions about "docket control" and "floodgates," see Hershkoff,
supra note 7, at 1932 nn.513-17.
56. An example of widened standing for a plaintiff who has no reason personally to
experience the alleged practice is Cornelius v. City of Ashland, 506 P.2d 182 (Or. App. 1973)
(issuing a declaratory judgment against an ordinance authorizing police to jail persons who
resist questioning).
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established equitable and common law remedies. It is not prudent
to link a decision declining adjudication to non-textual, self-
created constitutional barriers, and thereby to foreclose lawmakers
from facilitating impartial, reasoned resolutions of legal disputes
that affect people's public, rather than self-seeking, interests.
Requirements that rest only on statutory interpretations can be
altered to meet desired ends, but change becomes harder once
interpretations are elevated into supposedly essential doctrines of
"justiciability." The word itself is superfluous, and the doctrines are
unnecessary. Nothing in the typical texts, the history, or the
institutions of most state governments calls for reading the
formulas used by the United States Supreme Court into a state's
constitution.
